theologoumena

…[L]et us note that there are no existential gaps in change. Thus change is ontologically continuous. This follows from the fact that change adjectival to substance. However, this continuity is not the mathematical continuity of a compact series of moments. This is a consequence of the fact that a moment is a ‘limit’ of chronological duration, or, to put it in other words, is expressive of the fact that a space of time is indefinitely divisible. Thus a chronological duration is, so to speak, a ‘pure event’, and a moment a ‘limit’ or point as above defined. Thus, from our conclusion that an event is not a quantum of being, it follows that a moment, in turn, is not a quantum of being or becoming, and from the above considerations it follows that no state of a substance is momentary in the strict sense of this latter term. We can express this differently by saying that chronological time is not destructive; to be such is the nature of change. In conclusion let us make the following remarks. The main thesis of this paper can be summed up in a concise, if at first sight paradoxical, sentence as follows. Things endure, but there are no ‘durations.’ Hours, minutes and moments belong to the geometry of change as do points, lines and volumes to the geometry of extension. In neither case should discreteness be projected into existence. To do so is to create problems even as did the Greeks. - Wilfrid Sellars, Substance, Change and Event (MA Thesis)